The credibility of US backing for a DRC–Rwanda peace deal rests on the risk appetite of corporate America

Washington needs to back projects that support local livelihoods and offer security. It must also clarify US regulation to overcome mining operators’ wariness of investing in the Great Lakes region.

At a tense ceremony in Washington on 25 April, representatives from the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) and Rwanda committed to working towards a peace agreement to end ongoing violence in the Eastern DRC. The announcement came following mediation by Qatar underwritten by US promises of a minerals deal.

The agreement’s main points would include a respect for sovereignty and refraining from providing support to non-state groups – Rwanda has been accused of providing support to the M23 rebel group. Parallel talks were hosted subsequently in Doha, with DRC and Rwanda, as well as the AU mediation support group which includes France and the US. A draft peace agreement was reportedly submitted to the US on 5 May – although the two sides have said their proposals have not yet been consolidated.

All are hopeful that US investment in minerals will generate lucrative peace dividends. The region holds globally significant reserves of tantalum and niobium found in coltan – particularly around the rebel-held Congolese mining town of Rubaya – as well as tin and tungsten. All are listed as critical minerals by the US, EU, Japan, China and UK.

As ever, the devil will be in the detail. Turning a headline announcement into sustainable progress will require resolving deep suspicion between Rwanda and the DRC. A deal will also need to account for complex local political problems of land access and identity, wider security challenges in a region that hosts myriad non-state armed groups, and issues of asset scarcity.

Compounding this is the challenge of risk aversion: Corporate America is wary of operating in a conflict-affected and high-risk area (CAHRA), which requires enhanced due-diligence and reporting and carries governance, security and reputational challenges.

Political dealmaking

Headlines about a deal began appearing in late February 2025, with the DRC reported to be seeking ‘a formal security agreement’ with the US in exchange for access to Congolese minerals.

The DRC was looking to capitalize on the US and UN calling out Rwanda’s support for the M23 and illegal mineral flows. Washington and Kinshasa also have a mutual desire to limit Congolese dependence on China.

But rather than a bilateral US–DRC ‘minerals for security’ arrangement, Massad Boulos, Trump’s senior adviser for Africa and the Middle East, has said that bilateral economic agreements will be signed with both DRC and Rwanda ahead of a final peace accord, hopefully within two months.

This approach reflects the Trump administration’s instinct for peace deals that prioritize a realpolitik acceptance of the balance of power over the principle of territorial integrity or international law.

The M23’s direct involvement cuts across Kinshasa’s red line of not granting the group undeserved political legitimacy by bringing them to the table. DRC President Felix Tshisekedi’s seeming acceptance of the deal is a notable political concession.

The most significant details remain uncertain, notably how the benefits will be divided. One of the key drivers for Rwanda’s intervention in the DRC from 2022 was likely to protect and guarantee control of Congolese minerals. Kigali is unlikely to want its profits to be diluted – and is currently under little meaningful diplomatic or military pressure to give ground.

Any deal that asks President Tshisekedi to sign away rights to Congolese endowments may be deeply unpopular domestically. That will be particularly concerning for a president whose political hold already looks shaky. Beyond the carrot of US minerals deals, the wider set of actors involved in both mediation efforts may have to expend significant diplomatic capital to force the parties to abide by any agreement.

Asset scarcity and operational challenges

There are also significant technical limitations to a potential deal. The Tshekedi government may be eager for US engagement to balance China’s dominance, but there are few available assets for American companies to acquire.

Mining operations in the DRC’s peaceful southeastern copper and cobalt belt are already owned or operated by external actors. Chinese companies control 80 per cent of Congolese cobalt production.

The prize for a minerals deal is likely to be access to the conflict-affected east of DRC…and the fledgling industry in Rwanda.

US operators have largely divested from the DRC over the past two decades – although the US government is seeking to regain a foothold in the southern region, including through funding the Lobito Corridor. Support for this rail link between the Congolese copper belt and Atlantic seaboard has continued through the Biden and Trump administrations.

Instead, the prize for a minerals deal is likely to be access to the conflict-affected east of DRC (dominated by artisanal and semi-artisanal production) and the fledgling industry in Rwanda. Here, there are emerging foundations to build on.

Alpahmin’s Bisie mine, located close to the M23 conflict zone, is financed by US Denham Capital and has a 100 per cent offtake agreement with US trading firm Gerald Metals – although the material flows to China. It has consolidated former artisanal mining sites into the largest tin mine in Africa.

In Rwanda, Trinity Metals has also transformed former artisanal mining sites into a major tungsten producer – a mineral primarily found in China, Russia and North Korea. Its Western backers include Ireland-based TechMet, with funding from the US International Development Finance Corporation.

Kobold Metals, backed by Bill Gates and Jeff Bezos, is also expanding its exploration activities in the DRC and seeking to acquire part of the legally disputed Manono lithium project.

While such projects are important sources of formal jobs and revenues, they are relatively lightweight when set against decades of entrenched regional suspicion and local resistance. And there are few alternative entry points for wary US operators.

For lasting peace in the Great Lakes region, any new US minerals deal will demand a significant scaling up of investments, commitment and ideas.

Transparency, traceability and corporate risk appetite

What the US can offer is support for regional industry through finance for exploration, industrialized mining and infrastructure development. Credible commitment to the deal will require the rapid mobilization of American capital – both federal and private – into a complicated economic investment environment and a concerted effort to shift the risk appetite of corporate America.

Crucial to that will be providing clarity on the future of US regulation on responsible sourcing from the region. The 2010 US Dodd-Frank Act includes stringent reporting conditions for companies listed on the US stock exchange when purchasing tantalum, tungsten, tin and gold (3TG) from the DRC and neighbouring countries.

The inclusion of regional bodies, including the AU, in mineral traceability and verification efforts will be vital.

That regulation has subsequently been tightened by the US Securities and Exchange Commission. The International Conference on the Great Lakes Region (ICGLR) has also adopted a Regional Certification Mechanism (RCM) for the 3TGs which includes traceability as one of its main pillars, even if implementation remains patchy. The minerals deal will therefore have to acknowledge the complexities of navigating both domestic and regional legislation.

Another requirement for success is private sector understanding of the need for a social license to operate – the acceptance and approval of host communities in the region. The inclusion of regional bodies, including the AU, in mineral traceability and verification efforts will also be vital.

The credibility of the US minerals deal is uncertain. Much will depend on Washington’s ability to manage regional political tensions and convert high level promises into tangible investments. The Trump administration’s appetite for such a commitment, in an area of high risk and little current US commercial interest, will be hugely consequential for the region.

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