Dead End for the Tshisekedi Regime?

The Congolese President Tshisekedi, assisted by an efficient team at his Ministry of Foreign Affairs,succeeded these recent weeks to turn the tides of international public opinion towards the Kagame regime in Rwanda. The image of President Kagame shifted from “developmental dictator” to ruthless invader of his neighbour country, motivated by greed and thirst for power. Several western countries belatedly took sanctions against Rwanda in order to halt the progress of the M23/AFC movement supported by Rwandan troops.

This does not necessarily imply support for the Tshisekedi regime. Countries in the region and the DRC population are painfully aware of the profound flaws of his rule.

GOVERNANCE PROBLEMS

The parliamentary majority which was pro-Kabila after the 2018 elections was bought off to ensure a pro-Tshisekedi stance. The 2023 electoral process did not see a return to a legitimate majority by free and transparent elections, but most MPs and probably also the president occupied their seat thanks to disorganized fraud. As a result, the legitimacy of the governing institutions is deeply flawed. Legitimacy can be acquired by good and efficient governance, but this has so far not been the case. The current regime has clear issues with corruption, with the president justifying kickbacks as perfectly legal, or praising a minister of finance who reportedly embezzled millions of dollars. Comprehensive files have been drafted about cases of corruption by the Finance Inspectorate, but no legal process or sanctions have been initiated. Instead it appears as if clientelist appointments are preferred over competence, affecting the country’s governance in a negative manner. The government itself is superseded by an army of presidential counsellors, constituting a parallel government. As a result of these issues, national and international reputation of President Tshisekedi has been profoundly damaged, and furthermore undermined by the President’s problematic reliability, frequently contradicting himself.

The President’s management of the war in the East has clearly exposed his difficulties to run the country, leaving it with very little resistance against a rebellion supported by an invading army. He is kept in power mainly through international support (with a surprising certificate of good governance delivered by the IMF !) and an apparatus of repression headed by the president’s brother who nevertheless has no experience or training in security matters. The formal branch of the system is dominated by military intelligence (formerly called DEMIAP), doubled by a parallel informal branch headed by general John Tshibangu, who succeeded to have opponents arrested in Angola and Zambia, even in breach of elementary international law. Anyone who is considered to be an opponent is arrested, brought to secret detention centres and often disappears. This has proven to be efficient to block any dissident opinion. Apparently, priority is given to the protection of the regime rather than to find a realistic solution for the occupation of East Congo and the real problems behind the current crisis, despite a national budget for defense going beyond one billion USD.

nature of the current regime

What differentiates the Tshisekedi regime from its predecessors is its elevated communitarisation of power. The core of the regime is made up by Tshisekedi’s community of origin in the Kasai provinces. Despite his shortcomings, he enjoys considerable support through his community’s solidarity and external cohesion. After years of what the Kasai community experienced as discrimination, the Tshisekedi regime gave them clearly a preferential treatment for all appointments. Their often triumphalist attitude caused discontent with other communities and the regime is currently considered as a “Kasai regime” governing against the others. The project to replace the current constitution to enable the current regime to continue for many years understandably raised resistance all over the country, which was only tempered by repression and fear for losing any financial advantages. Civil society is currently considerably weakened because many leaders who were very active in the struggle to prevent Joseph Kabila to remain in power now changed their attitude and support the current president for reasons of community solidarity.

At the center of the power structure is the presidential family, with key members as the president’s mother controlling clientele networks all over the country. Almost any position of power or responsibility depends in one way or another from one or several members of the presidential family, be it members of parliament, province governors or vice-governors, military officers or members of the security apparatus. This implies that each clientele network neutralizes the others. It has become very difficult to sanction anyone for corruption, embezzlement or incompetence because of this clientele protection at the highest level. Needless to say that each network functions thanks to streams of money flowing from impoverished economic actors at the bottom to the top of the presidential family system.

This family network also uses the structures of the reigning UDPS political party.The UDPS during the nineties enjoyed massive support from all levels of society and all regions, in its struggle against the Mobutu regime. It is currently emptied from most of its competent officials and rules through local militias, attracting anyone looking for a job, a small remuneration, or even people engaging in criminal activities. The UDPS secretary general also commands a network all over the country.

what about katanga ?

The nature of the current regime is painfully felt in the mining province Katanga. A massive immigration from the impoverished Kasai provinces towards Katanga has created important social conflicts between the urbanized Katangese and the rural immigrant Kasai communities. The latter take on all sorts of small jobs, engage in petty trade and are recruited by local UDPS militias who are convinced that they have overtaken power and are at the origin of the appointments of a great number of UDPS officials (often from Kasai origin) in the Katanga provinces. They constitute a parallel power structure challenging the official authorities, controlling even a parallel customs administration at the key border post with Zambia Kasumbalesa, the export center of all minerals and key international trading post. With a great number of appointments of natives from Kasai at all levels, the local Katangese feel dominated and hope for the arrival of M23 to change the regime. They fear to speak out however because of the high level of repression. The party militias and the Kasai community (not the local Kasai community which has been living in the province for decades) fear vengeance from the Katangese if a regime change came about and have been armed with machetes and firearms to defend themselves.

Particularly important is the non-transparent managementof the mining sector by the current regime, going beyond anything committed in the past. According to local sources, not only are an important number of artisanal mining sites occupied by the government army and exploited for the real or alleged benefit of the presidential family, but military operations are organized to loot industrial production as happens e.g. with the Comide site from the company ERG, who reportedly wants to sell its assets because of this situation. According to some sources, the sale of 20% of the production of the TFM company by Gécamines takes an opaque and non transparent route. Some mining companies reportedly work one week per month for the presidential family. Even in East Congo, the arrest of Mwangachuchu heading the SMB company controlling the Rubaya mine, responsible for about 40% of the current world tantalum production, was reportedly motivated by an effort overtake the mine for the benefit of the presidential family. In Katanga there is little or no return for this looting in terms of local investments.

lost credibility for felix tshisekedi

Felix Tshisekedi has lost credibility at the national, regional and international level, most of all by his difficulty to honour his commitments. But who could come next ? The most obvious candidate Joseph Kabila, who recently ended his long silence by media interventions and political consultations, is supported in Katanga who consider him to be a lesser evil than the current president. However, Kabila does not seem to have modified his idea of governance, political inclusion or prospects for the future of the DRC. In his reactivation of his party PPRD, he aligns the same officials as before and has not displayed any new vision for the country beyond criticism of Tshisekedi. His ally Moise Katumbi lost his political momentum in 2018 and does not take responsibility for a sound political leadership. Martin Fayulu has failed to create any movement to consolidate his electoral victory in 2018. Still an important section of the younger, educated and technocratic political and economic elite of the country absolutely wants a profound change and a solution for the real problems of the country, even beyond the current political elite. If we want to avoid a a takeover by military who will not necessarily transform the country’s governance, or if we want to avoid a disintegration the country, new initiatives based on this discontent are essential.

The only realistic way forward, even if it is uncertain and tentative, is the initiative by CENCO/ECC who push for a broad dialogue and especially for a roadmap to address the real problems of the country through its “social pact”. This initiative, a beacon of hope, absolutely must be supported and encouraged at all levels. Only the Churches have currently a sufficient moral authority to design a framework for people and ideas to emerge who could point a way to a real solution. Yet another round of a transition which will inevitably lead to a recycling of a political elite disqualified in public opinion, will fail to bring a deeply needed real solution for the DRC.

By Erik Kennes (26 March 2025) at https://www.egmontinstitute.be/dead-end-for-the-tshisekedi-regime/